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Abstract—Location information is critical to a wide-variety of
navigation and tracking applications. Today, GPS is the de-facto
outdoor localization system but has been shown to be vulnerable
to signal spoofing attacks. Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) are
emerging as a popular complementary system, especially in road
transportation systems as they enable improved navigation and
tracking as well as offer resilience to wireless signals spoofing,
and jamming attacks. In this paper, we evaluate the security
guarantees of INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation for road
transportation systems. We consider an adversary required to
travel from a source location to a destination, and monitored by
a INS-aided GPS system. The goal of the adversary is to travel
to alternate locations without being detected. We developed and
evaluated algorithms that achieve such goal, providing the adver-
sary significant latitude. Our algorithms build a graph model for
a given road network and enable us to derive potential destina-
tions an attacker can reach without raising alarms even with the
INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation system. The algorithms
render the gyroscope and accelerometer sensors useless as they
generate road trajectories indistinguishable from plausible paths
(both in terms of turn angles and roads curvature). We also
designed, built, and demonstrated that the magnetometer can
be actively spoofed using a combination of carefully controlled
coils. We implemented and evaluated the impact of the attack
using both real-world and simulated driving traces in more than
10 cities located around the world. Our evaluations show that
it is possible for an attacker to reach destinations that are as
far as 30 km away from the true destination without being
detected. We also show that it is possible for the adversary to
reach almost 60–80% of possible points within the target region in
some cities. Such results are only a lower-bound, as an adversary
can adjust our parameters to spend more resources (e.g., time)
on the target source/destination than we did for our performance
evaluations of thousands of paths. We propose countermeasures
which can severely limit an attackers ability without the need
for any hardware modifications. For instance, our system can be
used as the foundation for countering such attacks, both detecting
and recommending paths that are difficult to spoof.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to track one’s location is important to a wide
variety of safety- and security-critical applications. For exam-
ple, logistics and supply chain management companies [1], [2],
[3] that handle high-value commodities (e.g., currency notes)
continuously monitor the locations of every vehicle in their
fleet carrying valuables to ensure their secure transportation
to the intended destination. Emergency support services such
as medical and law enforcement rely on location information
to track their personnel, optimize response times and to even
activate traffic signal lights appropriately. Law enforcement
officials use ankle bracelets [4], [5] to monitor the location of
defendants or parole and notify them if the offender strays
outside an allowed area. Ride-hailing applications such as
Uber and Lyft use location information for tracking, billing,
and assigning drivers to trips. Furthermore, the locations of
public transport [6], [7], [8] are continuously monitored to
ensure smooth and timely operation of services. With the
advent of autonomous vehicles and transport systems, the
dependence on location information is only bound to increase.
The majority of above applications rely on Global Positioning
Systems (GPS) [9] which is the de facto outdoor localization
system in use today. It is estimated that more than 8 billion
GNSS1 devices [10] will be in use by the year 2020.
However, it has been widely demonstrated that GPS is
vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks. One of the main reasons
is the lack of any form of signal authentication. It is today
possible to change the course of a ship [11], force a drone
to land in an hostile area [12] or fake the current location
in a road navigation system [13] by simply spoofing GPS
signals. The increasing availability of low-cost radio hardware
platforms make it feasible to execute such attacks with less
than few hundred dollars worth of hardware equipment. There
has been several evidences of jamming and spoofing reported
in the media. For example, [14] quotes “Because the toll-
taking for commercial trucks relies on GPS tracking, they can
avoid paying through jamming. If a $45 device made your
daily commute free, you too might be tempted to commit a
federal crime.” Another report [15] mentions “Gary Bojczak
admitted buying an illegal GPS jammer to thwart the tracking
device in his company vehicle”. Several countermeasures
have been proposed in the recent years either to detect or
to mitigate signal spoofing attacks. Cryptographic mitigation
techniques [16], [17], [18], [19] (e.g., military GPS systems
where the spreading codes are secret) require changes to the
satellite infrastructure. Furthermore their use requires distri-
bution and management of shared secrets, which makes them
impractical for majority of applications. Non-cryptographic
countermeasures [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26] rely
on identifying anomalies in the physical characteristics of the
received GPS signal. These techniques are either unreliable
(e.g., large number of false alarms), effective only against
1Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) is an umbrella term for
satellite based localization systems such as GPS, Galileo, Glonass etc.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
03
51
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 A
ug
 20
18
naive attackers or require modifications to the GPS receiver
itself. Alternate localization technologies using WiFi or cellu-
lar networks [27], [28] lack the accuracy and coverage required
for the above mentioned applications. Moreover, they consume
significant amount of power and are susceptible to external
signal and environmental interference.
Inertial navigation i.e., the use of sensors such as accelerom-
eter, gyroscope and compass to navigate during temporary
GPS outages have been around for decades, specifically in
aircrafts, spacecrafts and military vehicles [29], [30], [31].
The advancements in sensor manufacturing technologies have
resulted in widespread integration of these sensors into many
commonly used devices such as smart phones, tablets, fitness
trackers and other wearables. Many vehicle tracking and au-
tomotive navigation systems have integrated GPS with inertial
measurement units to improve localization and tracking of
individual vehicles [32], [33], [34], [35]. Inertial sensors are
key to the balancing and navigation technologies present in
modern segways. Low-cost inertial sensors have also prolif-
erated into the consumer drone industry today. One of the
key advantages of inertial navigation is its robustness and
resilience to any form of wireless signal spoofing and jamming
attacks as there is no need for the sensors to communicate or
receive information from any external entity such as satellites
or other terrestrial transponders. This makes them very attrac-
tive for use in security- and safety-critical localization and
tracking applications where GPS (or any wireless) spoofing
and jamming attacks are a concern. The main drawback
of inertial navigation units is the accumulating error of the
sensor measurements. These accumulated sensor measurement
errors affect the estimated position and velocity over a longer
duration of time and hence limit the maximum period an
inertial unit can act independently. This affects aerial and
maritime navigation capabilities significantly as the tracked
vehicle has all the six degrees of freedom to move. However,
in the context of road navigation, the vehicle is limited by the
road network and can only navigate within the constraints of
these existing roadways. These inherent constraints imposed
by the road networks have made low-cost inertial sensors very
valuable for quick attack detection and immediate tracking of
cheating entities [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41].
In this work, we evaluate the security guarantees of
GPS/INS based on-road location tracking systems. Specif-
ically, we address the following research questions: Given
a geographic area’s road network and assuming that both
GPS and inertial sensor data are continuously monitored for
tracking an entity’s location, is it possible for an attacker to
fake its navigation path or final destination? If yes, what are
the attacker’s constraints and possibilities? Can we exploit the
physical motion constraints that exist in an urban road network
and design a secure navigation algorithm that generates travel
routes that are hard to spoof? For example, can a driver of a
vehicle carrying high-value commodities (e.g., currency notes)
spoof his assigned route and deviate without being detected
by the monitoring center? Can a parole with GPS/INS ankle
monitor spoof his location and travel routes without causing
any discrepancies in the estimates computed by both GPS and
inertial sensors?
Specifically, we make the following contributions in this
paper. First, we demonstrate that GPS/INS based on-road
location tracking and navigation has severe limitations. We
develop algorithms and a system that show it is indeed possible
for an attacker to hijack vehicles far away from the intended
destination or take an alternate route without triggering any
alarms even though the GPS location as well as inertial
sensors are continuously monitored. We leverage the regular
patterns that exist in urban road networks and create a suite of
algorithms which we refer to as ESCAPE that automatically
suggests potential routes to spoof given a start point s, and
end point d. The paths are generated to be highly plausible to
travel from s to d, yet easy to spoof at the INS sensors levels.
Spoofing means that the adversary will travel on an alternate
path indistinguishable from the spoofed path. Our ESCAPE
suite of algorithms provides possible escape routes an attacker
can take without being detected while spoofing. It incorporates
intersections turn angles, roads curvatures, and magnetometer
bearing. We evaluated our attack’s feasibility and impact in
10 major cities across the globe and the results show that
an attacker can potentially take the vehicle as far as 30 km
before the monitoring system can detect a potential attack.
Note that even after detection, the tracking system has no
knowledge of the true location. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first demonstration of the security vulnerabilities
that exist in GPS/INS based location verification and tracking
systems. Our attack affects several services and applications
with effective monetary value running into several millions
of dollars. Our attacks essentially renders the gyroscope and
accelerometer useless by generating paths acceptable to the
monitoring system, but have a signature indistinguishable
from the trajectory effectively traveled by the adversary. For
the magnetometer, a sensor that can play a critical role in
detecting the incongruence of the claimed trajectory with the
measured heading, we built and demonstrated the effectiveness
of a magnetometer-spoofing device that physically generate a
magnetic field compatible with the spoofed trajectory. Finally,
based on the observations, we turn around our ESCAPE suite
of attack algorithms to build a countermeasure that the tracking
services can run to mitigate such spoofing attacks. Specifically,
we modified ESCAPE to output secure navigation routes that
can be assigned given a start and end points that severely limits
the attacker’s possibilities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of GPS
GPS is today the de-facto outdoor localization system used.
GPS is a satellite-based global navigation system that consists
of more than 24 satellites orbiting the earth at more than
20,000 km above the ground. Each satellite is equipped with
high-precision atomic clocks and hence the timing information
available from the satellites are in near-perfect synchroniza-
tion. Each satellite transmits messages referred to as the
navigation messages that are spread using pseudorandom
codes unique to that satellite. The GPS receiver on the ground
receives these navigation messages and estimates their time
of arrival. Based on the time of transmission contained within
the navigation message and its time of arrival, the receiver
computes its distance to each of the visible satellites. Once
the receiver acquires the navigation messages from at least
four satellites, the GPS receiver estimates its own location and
precise time using the standard technique of multilateration.
B. GPS Spoofing Attacks
Civilian GPS is easily vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks
due to the lack of any signal authentication and the publicly
known spreading codes for each satellite, modulation schemes,
and data structure. A GPS signal spoofing attack is a physical-
layer attack in which an attacker transmits specially crafted
radio signals that are identical to authentic satellite signals.
In a signal spoofing attack, the objective of an attacker may
be to force a target receiver to (i) compute a false geographic
location, (ii) compute a false time or (iii) disrupt the receiver
by transmitting unexpected data. Due to the low power of the
legitimate satellite signal at the receiver, the attacker’s spoofing
signals can trivially overshadow the authentic signals. During
a spoofing attack, the GPS receiver locks onto (acquires and
tracks) the stronger signal i.e., the attacker’s signals, ignoring
the legitimate satellite signals. This results in the receiver
computing a false position, velocity and time based on the
spoofing signals. Today, with the increasing availability of low-
cost radio hardware platforms [42], [43] and open source GPS
signal generation software [44], it is feasible to execute GPS
spoofing attacks with less than $100 of hardware equipment.
GPS signal generators can be programmed to transmit radio
frequency signals corresponding to either a static position
(e.g., latitude, longitude and elevation) or simulate entire
motion trajectory. For example, an attacker can spoof the
navigation route of a vehicle carrying high-value items and
hijack it to any arbitrary location without rising any alarms.
The operators of ride hailing services can fake the route taken
for a trip. Furthermore, GPS spoofing attacks can delay or even
prevent emergency support services from reaching the intended
destinations. Given the implications of GPS spoofing attacks
on road navigation and tracking applications, it is essential
to ensure resilience against these modern day cyber-physical
attacks.
C. Inertial Sensors Aided Navigation and Tracking
The need to operate effectively in scenarios where GPS
is inaccessible, unreliable or potentially jammed or spoofed
by adversaries has led to the increased interest in building
complementary navigation solutions and spoofing detection
techniques. Several countermeasures and alternative localiza-
tion techniques have been proposed. Of them, inertial sensors
are emerging as a popular choice for two main reasons.
First, inertial measurements are not affected by wireless signal
jamming and are therefore resilient to denial of service attacks.
Second, their widespread availability in majority of modern
smartphones makes them easy to deploy and integrate into
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Fig. 1: The constraints imposed by the road networks lead to
better accuracy in tracking road applications. The blue path is
the actual and estimated route taken by a vehicle and tracked
using low-cost inertial sensors. The green path is the estimated
trajectory in case of aerial navigation.
existing navigation and tracking infrastructure without the
need for any hardware or software modifications to the GPS
receiver.
Inertial navigation is the process of integrating the readings
of select sensors such as accelerometers, gyroscopes, and
magnetometer into a complete three-dimensional position,
velocity, and orientation solution. Inertial navigation systems
are classified as dead-reckoning, since the estimation process
is iterative and uses prior information i.e., calculating from
some previously known navigation solution. Accelerometers
measure both gravitational and non-gravitational acceleration
along each of the three axes. The gyroscopes measure the
rate at which an object is rotating, and are used to com-
pute the attitude and heading of the object. The gyroscope
measurements aid the accelerometer in figuring out the ori-
entation of the object. Typically, sets of three accelerometers
and three gyroscopes, both orthogonally aligned, are usually
combined into a single inertial measurement unit (IMU), which
commonly contains additional analog and digital circuitry,
including conversion and calibration components. As the name
implies, the magnetometer measures the magnetic fields and
thus determine the cardinal direction to which the object is
pointing.
One of the main drawbacks of low-cost inertial sensors
(e.g., MEMS [45]) is that the process of dead reckoning in
general, results in a build-up of errors over the course of the
measurement. Since the position, velocity, and attitude updates
are products of single or double integration of raw inertial
sensor readings, the errors propagate and affect the final
position, velocity and attitude estimates. For example, due to
the single integration performed on angular rate measurements,
a constant gyroscope bias will produce a linearly growing
angular error, the gyro noise will produce a ‘random walk’
growing with the square root of time. The double integration
required to transform the accelerometer output to position
produces a quadratically growing position error and a second-
order ‘random walk’, for a constant accelerometer bias and
white noise respectively. In numerical terms, a 25µm2s−1
accelerometer bias (≈ 245µg) of a navigation grade sensor
would produce a 1.59 km position error in one hour. The
aggravation of sensor errors becomes critical to aviation and
maritime applications as the vehicle have more degrees of
freedom to move. However, on road, the vehicles are limited
by the available road networks and are therefore severely
constrained in their possible trajectories. Figure 1 illustrates
how the bias errors affect the final position estimates in a
road navigation scenario (with motion constraints) and aerial
(without any motion constraints). These constraints imposed
inherently by the road networks has led to the emergence
of using inertial sensors to complement GPS navigation and
tracking solutions. Moreover, the inertial sensors are largely
immune to jamming which makes them invaluable to the safety
and security-critical applications described previously.
In this paper, we focus on the security of such on-road sys-
tems that rely on both GPS and inertial sensor measurements
for navigation and tracking. We begin with demonstrating how
an attacker can fake his navigation route even if both the GPS
and the inertial sensors are continuously monitored in the next
section.
III. SPOOFING INS-AIDED LOCALIZATION SYSTEMS
In this section, we demonstrate spoofing attacks on road
navigation and tracking applications that rely on both GPS
and the inertial sensors for the localization. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of spoofing
attacks on GPS/INS localization systems. First, we describe
the system and attacker model. Then, we give a high-level
overview of the proposed spoofing attack algorithms and
define relevant terminologies. Finally, we describe in detail
the working of our attack algorithms.
A. System and Attacker Model
In this work, we focus on localization and tracking systems
that rely on both GPS and INS measurements to navigate
and track entities. As described previously, such GPS/INS
systems are gaining popularity in road navigation and tracking
applications due to the improved accuracy, availability and
resilience to signal jamming/spoofing attacks. Our attack is
independent of how the GPS/INS system is deployed i.e., it
can either be an app on a trusted smartphone or a specialized
tracking device (e.g., ankle monitors) installed on the entity
of interest. The main objective of the monitoring system is
to keep track of the location and navigation routes of the
entities. We assume an attacker capable of generating and
transmitting fake GPS signals corresponding to any location
or navigation route of his choice using tools such as GPS-
SDR-SIM [44]. The goal of the attacker is to spoof his
location and navigation trajectory without being detected. For
example, the attacker can try to deviate from an assigned
navigation route and reach as far away as possible from the
intended destination before an anomaly is detected and an
alarm raised. At that moment, the adversary’s location remains
undetermined. Alternately, the attacker starts and ends at the
intended locations, however using a different route than the
one being reported to the monitoring station. We assume that
the attacker has full physical access to the entity being tracked
Fig. 2: An example of a spoofed path in Manhattan and
the escape destinations generated for that single spoofed
path. Our algorithms generate 100 spoofed paths for a given
source/destination locations, allowing an adversary to unde-
tectably reach an even larger set of location.
and is aware of the GPS/INS system deployed for monitoring.
However, we assume that the tracking device itself is tamper-
proof. For example, the attacker can be a driver of a cargo
company (or a hijacker) who has full access to the vehicle. He
regularly drives this vehicle to transport high-value goods, and
is aware of the GPS and INS based tracking system employed
by the company. However, he cannot modify the software on
the smartphone or physically tamper the tracking device.
B. Overview of the Attack
The primary objective of the attacker is to fake the reported
navigation route without raising suspicion of any mischief.
Note that simply spoofing GPS signals is not sufficient as
the INS measurements will indicate discrepancies between
the reported GPS location and the inertial estimates. In order
to successfully execute the attack, it is now necessary for
the attacker to identify and spoof navigation paths that have
similar distances, road curvature, and turn angles to minimize
the discrepancies between the INS and GPS estimates. Our
system, which we refer to as ESCAPE, exploits the regular
patterns that exist in many cities’ road networks and identifies
navigation paths that are similar to the route that is reported to
the monitoring center. As a result, the inconsistencies between
the INS and GPS estimates are negligible and the attack is
successfully executed.
The attack begins with the attacker providing the start and
end points of the assigned trip to ESCAPE. Then, ESCAPE
computes two sets of paths: (i) spoofed paths and (ii) escape
paths. The spoofed paths are a set of paths that exist between
the input start and end points of the trip. These are the paths
that the attacker will generate fake GPS signals and spoof
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Fig. 3: Example of a road network and its corresponding graph
representation.
the receiver to report to the monitoring center. These should
be plausible paths for the source and destination locations,
and not raise suspicion. For every spoofed path, ESCAPE
computes a set of escape paths which the attacker can use to
deviate from the intended course while executing the spoofing
attack. In other words, a spoofed path is the route that is
reported to the monitoring center and the escape path is
the true route taken by the attacker to reach an alternate
destination. The attacker then picks an escape path that enables
him to reach his intended location. The intended location can
either be a point far away from the assigned destination (to buy
the adversary some time) or just a diversion before reaching
the assigned destination. The selected escape path corresponds
to a spoofed path which the attacker can use to generate
spoofing signals. Figure 2 illustrates an example of a spoofed
path generated between two end points in Manhattan (green
line from green marker to red marker) and the destinations
of the escape paths (red points) generated for this particular
spoofed path. Finally, the attack is executed by spoofing the
tracking device to report the spoofed path while the attacker
actually drives the escape path. In the next section, we present
the inner working of our ESCAPE attack system.
C. Internals of ESCAPE
ESCAPE consists of three main building blocks: (i) graph
constructor, ii) spoofed paths generator and (iii) escape paths
generator. The graph constructor generates directed graphs
based on the road network present in the geographic area
of interest. Our attack does not enforce any limits on the
geographic area. As the name suggests, the spoofed and escape
paths generator blocks are responsible for computing and
identifying spoofed and escape paths for the attacker.
1) Graph Constructor: The paths for a geographic area
G are generated from a directed graph GG = (V,E). We
chose OpenStreetMap [46] as the map provider because it
contains accurate road information for all major cities of the
Input: G = (V,E), Loc(s), Loc(d), NP
Output: S = {p1, . . . , pNP }
1 Initialization : S ← ∅; p← [ ]; v ← ∅
2 s← getSourceV ertex(Loc(s))
3 d← getDestinationV ertex(Loc(d))
4 GenerateSpoofedPaths(s, d)
5 S ← selectTopPaths(S, NP )
6 function GenerateSpoofedPaths(s, d):
7 p← p+ [s]
8 v ← v ∪ {s}
9 if s = d then
10 S ← S ∪ {p}
11 else
12 for e ∈ V such that (s, e) ∈ E do
13 if e 6∈ v and Filter(s, e, p) passed then
14 p.score← p.score ∗ Score(s, e, p)
15 GenerateSpoofedPaths (e, d)
16 end
17 p← p− [s]
18 v ← v − {s}
Algorithm 1: Spoofed Paths Algorithm
world along with various meta-data such as types of roads
and buildings. Each geographic area can be represented as
G = (A, C, θ, ϑ), where A is a set of atomic sections and
C = {χ = (s, s′)|s, s′ ∈ A} is a set of connections where
χ indicates a connection between two atomic sections s
and s′. We define an atomic section as a section of road
between two intersections, such that it preserves the road’s
curvature but does not contain turns or sharp curves. A
connection becomes an intersection on the road that connects
two atomic sections. Note that these connections may extend
the same road or may turn into another road. The turn angle
associated with a connection χ is given by the function θ(χ)
and the atomic section’s curvature is given by the function
ϑ(s) as defined in Equation 1. In this graph construction,
we represent each atomic section s by a vertex v ∈ V
and each connection χ by an edge e ∈ E. Figure 3 shows
an example road network and the corresponding graph
construction. A default speed limit is assigned to each
atomic section based on the road type in OpenStreetMap.
For example, a ‘motorway’ symbolizes interstates in the
USA that have speed limits ≈ 65mph. The length, speed
limit, and geographic coordinates of the atomic section s
are stored as attributes of the corresponding vertex v. The
length and speed limit are used to calculate the fastest time
of travel between the end points. It is important to note that
this is a one time initialization step for every geographic area.
2) Spoofed Paths Generator: Recall that the spoofed paths
generator searches and compiles possible paths between the
source and destination points assigned to a specific trip. We
define spoofed paths as follows. The spoofed paths are a set
of N routes S = {S1, . . . ,SN} such that Si has a higher
likelihood of spoofing than Sj , where i < j and Si,Sj ∈ S .
Each route Si contains a list of geographic coordinates start-
ing and ending at the input source and destination. Given the
geographic area of the attacker, the algorithm generates paths
that maximize the probability of finding similar road curvature
and turn angles in other sections of the area. Therefore,
it maximizes the number of escape paths. It leverages the
fact that urban areas have regular patterns where most roads
typically run straight and turn angles are at right angles. This
is achieved by implementing a scoring scheme that ranks paths
containing such regular patterns higher than other non-regular
paths between the same source and destination. Figure 4 shows
the curvature and turn angle distribution for Manhattan and
provides an intuition for our approach. Here we see that most
turn angles are 90◦ which implies that given a path with
all ≈ 90◦ turns, the probability of finding another path with
similar turn angles (i.e., all ≈ 90◦) will be high.
The idea underlying the spoofed paths generator is to find
paths that contain attributes likely to be found in other sections
of the graph. When such paths are found, they increase the
likelihood of finding similar paths to other destinations in the
graph. To this extent, we implement a scoring scheme that
analyses the road curvature and turn angles of the geographic
area and maximizes the score of paths that contain curvature
and turns having a higher probability of occurrence. The
path search algorithm is implemented as a modified Depth
First Search (DFS) algorithm. A typical DFS implementation
computes a single path between a given source and destination.
This limits an attacker’s ability to generate multiple spoofed
paths between these end points. We extend the basic DFS
algorithm to compute all plausible non-cyclic paths between
the source and destination. For large graphs (typical for large
cities), the above modification results in an inefficient search
where each vertex may be visited numerous times. To scale
the algorithm, we incorporate filtering and scoring functions in
order to speed up computation by filtering out unlikely paths
and pruning low scoring paths at every iteration.
The spoofed paths generator algorithm (Algorithm 1) takes
as input a graph G = (V,E), the source Loc(s) and
destination Loc(d) geographic coordinates, and a count of
output paths NP . The algorithm outputs a set of spoofed
paths S sorted by the path score. The algorithm starts by
initializing the current path p and a set of visited vertices
v (line 1). It uses the attacker’s source s and destination
d vertices as parameters to GenerateSpoofedPaths to
recursively compute the output paths (lines 2 – 4). In the
end, these paths are sorted by score and the top NP paths
are saved as the final set of spoofed paths S (line 5). Inside
the GenerateSpoofedPaths function, the algorithm adds
the vertex s to the current path p and the visited set v (lines
7 – 8) and adds this path p to the output set S when the
destination vertex is found (lines 9 – 10). Otherwise, the
algorithm traverses over the path’s outgoing edges e such that
(s, e) ∈ E. During this traversal (lines 12 – 16), filtering is
applied to prune edges that are unlikely to occur (line 13) and
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Fig. 4: Curvature and Turn Distribution for Manhattan.
a scoring function is applied to rank remaining edges (line 14).
The filtering and scoring methodology are described next. The
GenerateSpoofedPaths function is recursively invoked
for each outgoing edge e (line 15). Note that, in the end, the
source s vertex is removed from the current path p and visited
set v to backtrack and proceed with the depth-first search (lines
17 – 18).
Scoring: Recall that all the vertices of the graph G = (V,E)
are atomic sections, and the edges connect two atomic sections
(c.f. Section III-C1). The turn angle of an edge χ = (s, s′),
where (s, s′) ∈ E, is given by the function θ(χ) and the
curvature of an atomic section s is given by the function ϑ(s).
This curvature ϑ(s) can be computed from the geographic
coordinates of the atomic section. Let B = {B1, . . . ,BN}
denote the set of bearings computed from N geographic
coordinates. Let B0 be the bearing of an imaginary line
connecting the first and last geographic coordinates of this
atomic section. The curvature ϑ(s) of this atomic section is
calculated as the normalized absolute difference of all bearings
in B from the reference bearing B0, i.e.,
ϑ(s) =
∑N
i=1 |Bi − B0|
N
. (1)
The set of all road curvatures ϑ = {ϑ(s′)|∀s′ ∈ V } and turn
angles θ = {θ(χ′)|∀χ′ ∈ E} represents the road structure
of the geographic area. Figure 4 shows these attributes for
Manhattan. Note that most of the calculated curvature values
are 0◦ and most turn angles are at 90◦. This is typical of
Manhattan and other cities synonymous with grid-like road
structures. To use this information for scoring, a probability
distribution table is precomputed for the area. This table can
be represented as P (G) = {P (c, t)|c ∈ ϑ, t ∈ θ}, where each
entry is the probability of occurrence of a specific curvature
and turn combination (rounded to the nearest integer).
A path on the graph with M vertices can be represented
using each vertex’s curvature and the next edge’s turn angle,
i.e., p = [(c1, t1), . . . , (cM−1, tM−1), (cM , 0)], where ci ∈ ϑ
and ti ∈ θ. In the beginning, the path is initialized to a
score of 1. For each vertex sˆ and edge χˆ = (sˆ, s′) added to
the path, the probability P (ϑ(sˆ), θ(χˆ)) is obtained from the
table P (G). Note that, owing to the algorithm construction, all
connecting edges have equal probability of occurrence and are
independent of the current path. Therefore, the score at each
vertex is multiplied with the previous path score to calculate
the compound probability of all vertices in the path. The final
path score is calculated as
score =
M∏
i=1
P (ϑ(si), θ(χi)). (2)
Filtering: The algorithm is designed to generate all paths
between the input source and destination. For a large graph,
the number of possibilities can be in the order of billions
making this search very inefficient. To scale the computation,
the algorithm uses the following filters to speed-up the search
of plausible paths, while enabling ranking. Given the current
path p, source s, edge e and destination d, the algorithm
filters the edge when the path’s distance summed with the
euclidean distance between the edge and destination exceeds
a maximum allowed distance, i.e., d(p)+ d(c, d) > F ∗ d(PI)
where d(.) denotes the distance of a path and PI denotes
the shortest time path between the source and destination.
For this work, we set F = 1.2 to only allow paths that
are similar in distance to the computed shortest path. The
algorithm also maintains the best N paths at all times, and
any new path p′ having a worse score is filtered. For our
evaluation, we chose N = 100 in order to determine the
attack efficiency in many cities for many paths (the algorithm
runs in around 1 minute for each source/destination pair).
However, a determined attacker with sufficient resources
can easily use a larger N to increase the count of spoofed
paths. Furthermore, the adversary will only be interested in a
single source/destination pair of locations on each instance
of the attack, and can therefore take more time to derive
the largest set possible of spoofed and escape paths. The
shortest path PI is also bounded by a rectangle (with added
padding of m = 1000 meters) such that all edges outside the
rectangle become out of scope. Note that the above algorithm
parameters are tunable and set to conservative values in this
work. We believe that the attack performance can substantially
improve when these parameters are tuned more aggressively,
e.g., setting F = 1.5 and N = 1000 (large values of N are
very reasonable when focusing on a single source/destination).
3) Escape Paths Generator: The idea behind the escape
paths generator is to find all the paths an attacker can travel
to reach different destinations without raising any alarms. An
important consideration for this algorithm is that all computed
paths must have similar accelerometer and gyroscope patterns
to the spoofed paths, to avoid detection by GPS/INS tracking
systems. We formally define escape paths as follows. The
escape paths corresponding to a spoofed path Si are a set
of M routes Ei = {Ei1 , . . . , EiM } such that Eij 6= Si, but
semantically similar to Si, for any Eij ∈ Ei. The paths are
semantically similar when they have similar distances, road
curvature and turn angles. These paths start at the input
source, however, end at different destinations from the intended
destination.
Input: G = (V,E), SI
Output: NP , E = {p1, . . . , pNP }
1 Initialization : E ← ∅; NP ← 0; p← [ ]; v ← ∅
2 s← getSourceV ertex(SI)
3 t← getTurnsCount(SI)
4 GenerateEscapePaths(s, t)
5 function GenerateEscapePaths(s, t):
6 p← p+ [s]
7 v ← v ∪ {s}
8 if len(p.turns) > t then
9 return
10 if len(p.turns) = t then
11 E ← E ∪ {p}
12 NP ← NP + 1
13 for e ∈ V such that (s, e) ∈ E do
14 if e 6∈ v and Filter(s, e, p,SI) passed then
15 p.curve← updateCurvature(s, e, p)
16 p.turns← updateTurns(s, e, p)
17 p.score← p.score ∗ Score(s, e, p,SI)
18 GenerateEscapePaths (c, t)
19 end
20 p← p− [s]
21 v ← v − {s}
Algorithm 2: Escape Paths Algorithm
Given a spoofed path, the escape paths algorithm (Algo-
rithm 2) generates a set of escape paths with similar distances,
road curvatures and turn angles to the spoofed path. The
algorithm is similar to that of the spoofed paths generator.
The main differences being that the algorithm uses each
spoofed path SI generated in the previous stage as input, where
SI ∈ S, and outputs a set of escape paths E . Furthermore, the
escape paths generator algorithm uses the count of turns in the
spoofed path as a parameter to GenerateEscapePaths
(lines 3 – 4) and checks whether the desired count of turns
has been reached for the escape path under consideration (lines
10 – 12).
The deviations from the spoofed paths (to avoid INS de-
tection) can be determined by analyzing the noise sensitivity
of the inertial sensors used for tracking. We demonstrate that
commodity accelerometers and gyroscopes present challenges
in accurately calculating the distances, road curvature and turn
angles which can allow an attacker to travel to multiple desti-
nations without detection. We also show that magnetometers
can be easily spoofed rendering them incapable of detecting
anomalies in the heading direction of the vehicle. Our analysis
of the accelerometer and gyroscope noise and the potential of
magnetometer spoofing are reported in Section IV-A. Unlike
the spoofed paths generator algorithm that ranked paths by
score, the escape paths computed by this algorithm always
have a score of 1. The intuition is that all paths that pass
the algorithm’s filters are certain to avoid detection by INS
tracking systems.
Filtering: In this algorithm, we represent the input spoofed
path by SI = {(dI , ϑI , θI)} where dI and ϑI denote the set
of distances and road curvatures between intersections and θI
denotes the turn angles at the intersections. We first present
the idea of filtering using just turn angles θI , and later expand
the discussion to include distances dI and road curvatures ϑI .
Let θI = {θ(χ1), . . . , θ(χK)} be the derived turn angles of
the spoofed path, where K is the number of intersections.
A turning connection χ′ = (s, e) in the escape path, where
(s, e) ∈ E, is valid for an intersection k ∈ K when the turn
angle difference is below a set threshold value Tθ, i.e., |θ(χk)−
θ(χ′)| ≤ Tθ. The parameter Tθ depends on the noise sensitivity
of the gyroscope sensor.
The filter for distances dI is similar to turn angles. Let dI =
{d1, . . . , dK+1} be the derived distances of the spoofed path
traveled between K intersections. For an intersection k ∈ K,
dk represents the path’s distance from the previous intersection
k− 1, i.e., dk = d(k)− d(k− 1) where d(.) denotes the total
distance of the spoofed path at a given intersection. Note that
k = 0 is the source of the path and k = K+1 is the destination
of the path. A connection χ′ in the escape path is valid for
intersection k when its path distance from previous intersection
k − 1 is between a range defined by the kth intersection of
the spoofed path, i.e., dk ∗ Td1 ≤ d’(k) − d’(k − 1) ≤ dk ∗
Td2. Here, d’(.) denotes the distance of the escape path at an
intersection. The above parameters Td1 and Td2 depend on the
noise sensitivity of the accelerometer sensor.
The filter for road curvature ϑI is more complex than turn
angles and distances. The reason is that, given an intersection
k ∈ K, the distance dk and turn angle θ(χk) are scalars
while ϑ(sk) is a vector that must be derived from bearings of
the road segment sk between intersections k − 1 and k. Two
different vectors of bearings Bk and B′ for road segments sk
and s′, respectively, cannot be compared directly as they may
be of different lengths and in different orientations, e.g., Bk
may be directed north when B′ is directed east. Our idea of
calculating the road curvature similarity, denoted by C(sk, s′),
is to translate these bearings to the same size N using linear
interpolation, convert the interpolated bearings to curvature,
and then compare the curvatures. Let BIk and B′I represent
the interpolated bearings for Bk and B′, respectively. The cur-
vature of a road segment s with M bearings B = [b1, . . . , bM ]
can be derived by subtracting the first bearing b1 from all the
bearings in B, i.e., ϑ(s) = [(b1 − b1), . . . , (bM − b1)]. Let
ϑ(sk) and ϑ(s′) be the curvatures derived from BIk and B′I ,
respectively. The curvature similarity of the two segments can
then be represented as:
C(sk, s′) = {|ck − c′| ∀ck ∈ ϑ(sk),∀c′ ∈ ϑ(s′)}. (3)
A connection χ′ in the escape path is valid for intersection
k when the maximum curvature similarity value is below a
set threshold value Tϑ, i.e., max(C(sk, s′)) ≤ Tϑ. Like turn
filtering, this parameter Tϑ also depends on the gyroscope
noise sensitivity.
To avoid detection, the above discussed constraints must
hold for all K intersections of the escape path. Therefore, a
escape path is considered valid if and only if all the following
conditions are met.
|θ(χk)− θ(χ′)| ≤ Tθ, ∀ k = 1, . . . ,K
dk ∗ Td1 ≤ d’(k)− d’(k − 1) ≤ dk ∗ Td2, ∀ k = 1, . . . ,K + 1
max(C(sk, s′)) ≤ Tϑ, ∀ k = 1, . . . ,K + 1
IV. ATTACK IMPACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present the implementation of our attack
and evaluate evaluate its effectiveness in various cities across
the globe. First, we evaluate the accuracy of inertial sensors
and derive realistic noise threshold settings for ESCAPE
algorithm. Then, we describe the details of our experimental
setup and the methodology. Finally, we present the results of
our evaluation using two metrics, (i) displacement from the
assigned destination and (ii) coverage area of the escape paths.
A. Accuracy of Inertial Sensors
The sensor data for evaluating the noise sensitivity of
accelerometers and gyroscopes was obtained from an open
dataset [47]. This dataset comprises of accelerometer, gyro-
scope and magnetometer samples recorded from ≈ 140 real
driving experiments in the cities of Boston and Waltham, MA,
USA. The sensor samples were collected on 4 smart phones
(HTC One M7, LG Nexus 5, LG Nexus 5X, and Samsung S6).
The GPS traces for these routes were also recorded for ground
truth comparison. The authors of that work focused specifically
on gyroscope noise during turns. We extend their work to also
determine noise sensitivity when distance is calculated from
the accelerometer sensor, as well as when road curvature is
calculated from the gyroscope sensor.
1) Accelerometer Accuracy: The accelerometer sensor can
be used to calculate the distance traveled for a path. This data
can be represented as a vector a = [(a1 + n1), . . . , (aT +
nT )] sampled at discrete time intervals t ∈ T , where at is the
true acceleration experienced by the device on the x, y and z
axis, and nt is an unknown noise quantity caused by several
factors. For example, the sensors have an inherent bias due
to manufacturing defects such as axis misalignment. Another
source of noise is the vibrations caused by the mechanical
structure of the vehicle and the engine. Additional noise is
induced on the sensor due to external environments such as
road conditions and traffic.
We are interested in finding the range of divergence from
the actual values due to nt, when distance is calculated from
the accelerometer data. To obtain this range, we calculated
the distances between intersections using accelerometer data
for each sensor path in the data-set, and compared it to the
actual distances obtained from OpenStreetMap. Note that, to
reduce the impact of noise, we performed the calibration
and rotation techniques described in [47] before calculation.
We also average multiple samples together to further reduce
the impact from noise. As distances may significantly vary
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Fig. 5: Accelerometer (distance) and Gyroscope (road curva-
ture and turn angle) errors measured using real experiments.
between intersections, we represent the distance error as a
ratio of the derived accelerometer distances to the actual
distances. More precisely, if ds is a vector of N derived
accelerometer distances and da is a vector of N actual
distances, then the errors ea can be represented as a vector
ea = [(ds1/da1), . . . , (dsN /daN )]. Figure 5a shows the distri-
bution of the errors ea. Note that the desired value for an error
should be near 1, however, we see large variations ranging
between 0.1 to 5. This indicates that the accelerometer sensor
is unsuitable for distance calculation and enables an attacker
to travel much larger distances than the intended path. Recall
that the escape paths generator algorithm uses parameters Td1
and Td2 to filter connections of the escape paths based on
distances (Section III-C3). These parameters are chosen from
the error distribution ea such that the allowed range is based
on the 75th percentile of the distribution, i.e., Td1 = 0.2 and
Td2 = 3.3.
2) Gyroscope Accuracy: The gyroscope sensor can be used
to measure the turn angles and the road curvature of the path.
This data can also be represented as the vector g = [(g1 +
n1), . . . , (gT + nT )], where gt is the rate of angular change
experienced by the device on the x, y and z axis, and nt is an
unknown noise quantity. In this case, however, the impact of nt
is not as significant as accelerometers and the measurements
are closer to the actual values.
We are interested in finding the turn angle errors and
the curvature errors calculated from the gyroscope data, in
comparison to the actual values derived from OpenStreetMap.
To calculate the turn errors, we use a similar approach to [47]
in that we define a turn error as the absolute difference between
the gyroscope derived turn angle and the actual turn angle.
(a) Experimental setup used for magnetometer spoofing
(b) The two-coil system attached to a Google Pixel 2
Fig. 6: The experimental setup implemented for demonstrating
the potential of magnetometer spoofing.
However, we are interested in the overall error distribution for
all the phones instead of individual phones. Figure 5b shows
the distribution of the turn angle errors for all the turns in the
data-set. The distribution reaffirms that the gyroscope is much
more accurate than the accelerometer where 75% of the turn
errors are within 5.5◦.
To calculate the curvature errors, recall our technique for
calculating curve similarity C(sk, s′) for two road segments
sk and s′ between the (k − 1)th and kth intersections (Equa-
tion (3)). The road curvature ϑ(sk) is already known in the
form of the gyroscope data. However, this curvature must be
interpolated to the same length as ϑ(s′). Given the union of
curve similarity sets for all K intersections for N sensor paths
C = ⋃Ni=1 Ci, where Ci = ⋃Kj=1 C(sj , s′j), the curvature errors
ec is simply a set of absolute differences between all the
points in the two curves, i.e., ec = {|cs− ca| ∀[cs, ca] ∈ C}.
Figure 5c shows the distribution of the curve errors. Recall that
the escape paths generator algorithm defines parameters Tθ
and Tϑ to filter connections based on turn angles and curvature,
respectively (Section III-C3). Based on the 75th percentile of
the error distributions, we set the parameters to Tθ = 5.5◦ and
Tϑ = 2.8
◦ in our evaluations.
3) Magnetometer Spoofing: As a proof of concept, we
built a prototype of a magnetometer spoofer for the Google
Pixel 2 smart phone. Our experimental setup is shown is
Figure 6a and consists of the following modules: (A) an ESP32
microcontroller, (B) a 8-channel relay module, (C) resistors
for controlling current flow, (D) a two coils system, and (E)
a Google Pixel 2 mounted on a car mount. We first identified
the exact location of the magnetometer which is on the top-
left of the phone (42mm from the top and 7mm from left
edge of the phone). We designed and 3D printed a two-coils
system, shown in Figure 6b, that snaps on to the phone and
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Fig. 7: An example of spoofing the magnetometer bearings for
an example route in Manhattan.
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Fig. 8: Comparison of the Curvature and Turn Distribution for
selected cities.
allows the wrapping of enameled magnet wire. We focused on
controlling the x and y axes as they are easily reachable. Using
two coils each targeting one of the axes allows full control of
the magnetic field in a plane. We used the following solenoid
magnetic field formula to estimate the intensity:
B = kµ0nI
where k is the relative permeability, µ0 = 4pi10−7 H/m, n is
the coil turn density, and I is the electric current. Our coils
turn density n is 155 turns/meter since we used 5 layers of
28 AWG enameled magnet wire. Without a core (k = 1), we
estimated a magnetic field of 98uT with a current of 5mA,
which is strong enough to impact the magnetometer. Note that
if the magnetometer is not accessible in other systems, it is
possible to use larger coils or channel the magnetic field using
materials with higher relative permeability. While the relative
permeability of air is 1, it is 5, 000 for iron, and 200, 000 for
iron annealed in hydrogen. To control the current in each of
the coils, we used the ESP32 microcontroller (Heltec WiFi Kit
32) with a sufficient number of GPIO/DAC pins to control the
8-channel relay module augmented with variable resistors for
current tuning. The spoofer was written in Python and takes as
input a sequence of bearings and durations. It sets the current
in the coils to trigger turns with a timing that matches the input
durations. The spoofing of an example route in Manhattan is
shown in Figure 7.
B. Simulation Setup and Evaluation Methodology
We implemented the ESCAPE attack algorithms in PyPy, a
JIT compiler based alternative implementation of Python. We
used two servers running Intel Xeon CPUs at 2.40GHz with
12 cores and 20GB of RAM to execute the algorithms and
evaluate its performance i.e., how far can an attacker escape,
given a start and end point, without being detected.
Selection of cities: We evaluate the effectiveness of our
attack on the road networks of 10 major cities across the
globe. The following cities were chosen across the continents
of North America, Europe and Asia for the evaluation:
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston, Manhattan and San
Francisco (North America), Beijing (Asia), London, Frankfurt
and Paris (Europe). The cities were chosen to represent
the entire spectrum of urban characteristics such as major
logistics and transportations hubs, dense population, city
planning (e.g., grid-like or circular), etc. Figure 8 shows
the cumulative road curvature and turn distributions for all
selected cities. Recall that the road curvatures are calculated
using Equation (1). We can observe that Chicago and
Manhattan have mostly straight roads and right angled turns
while the road networks of London and Paris have very
unique characteristics.
Generation of spoofed and escape routes: The evaluation
was performed by running simulations for every selected city.
This simulation data comprised of 1000 randomly generated
paths in every city, such that the path distances were uniformly
distributed between 1km and 21kms. The intention was to
evaluate the potential of spoofing also as a function of the
path distance. The simulation paths were generated as follows:
(i) a random ‘Home’ and ‘Work’ location were chosen from
OpenStreetMap inside the interest area, (ii) the geographic
coordinates of the end points were retrieved, and (iii) the
coordinates were given as input to the attack algorithms to
compute the spoofed and escape paths. Recall that the spoofed
paths are all possible paths between the source and destination
points assigned to a specific trip and escape paths are all the
paths an attacker can travel to reach different destinations
without being detected by the GPS/INS based monitoring
system. A ‘Home’ location can be chosen as a way or node in
OpenStreetMap whose building type is one of the following:
‘apartments’, ‘house’, ‘residential’, or ‘bungalow’. Similarly,
a ‘Work’ location can be chosen from the ‘commercial’ or
‘industrial’ tags.
C. Evaluation Results
We measure the performance of our attack using the two
metrics: (i) displacement from the actual destination and (ii)
coverage area.
Displacement from Intended Destination: We define
displacement from the intended destination as the farthest
distance an attacker can reach for a chosen trip (i.e., given
a start and end point) without being detected. For every
evaluation route, escape and spoofed paths are generated
as described previously. We then calculate the euclidean
distance between the destinations an attacker reaches by
taking the escape route and the actual intended destination
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Fig. 9: The displacement from intended destination and the
maximum displacement in every city chosen for evaluation.
i.e., the assigned end point for the trip. We present our results
in Figure 9. Figure 9b shows the attacker’s deviation from
the intended or assigned destination for the generated routes
in all 10 cities. It can be observed that in majority of the
cities, more than 20% of the routes allow more than 10 km
deviation from the intended destination. There are at least
10% of the routes in all selected cities where the attacker is
able to reach points as far as 30 km away from the assigned
destination. Chicago and Manhattan perform the worst among
the selected cities with more than 40% of the routes allowing
a displacement of 15 km or above. This is due to the regular
patterns that exist in these cities’ road network. Figure 9a
shows the maximum displacement in each city for specific
assigned route lengths. It is important to observe that in
Manhattan and Chicago the maximum displacement caused
is independent of the assigned route distance. This is due to
the structure of the cities itself. For example, Manhattan is a
narrow strip with grid like structures and therefore maximum
displacement saturates at some point. However, for a city
like Beijing there are routes that allow an attacker to spoof
his location to as far as 40 km away from the intended location.
Coverage Area of Spoofed Paths: The goal of this evalua-
tion is to determine the percentage of area an attacker can
cover by traveling the escape paths generated for a given
source Loc(s) and destination Loc(d) geographic coordinates.
Let A denote the total geographic area of interest to an
attacker. For this evaluation, we define this area as a circle of
radius r = d(Loc(s), Loc(d)) with center at Loc(s) where r
is the euclidean distance between the source and destination.
The above area may comprise of water bodies which must
be accounted for more accurate coverage. Let AL denote the
area of land within the interest area. Within AL, let AC denote
the area that the attacker can cover if he is willing to walk
a small distance r′ from an escape destination. The value
(AC/AL)∗100 then expresses the percentage of coverage area
of the escape paths.
The area AL is not trivial to calculate as the location
of water bodies are not pre known within the interest area.
The area AC is also not trivial to calculate as the escape
destinations may be densely populated and many may overlap.
To solve this, we implemented Monte-Carlo simulations to
estimate the above areas. The simulation works by generating
millions of uniformly distributed points within the interest
area. It maintains two separate counters: PL to count all the
points that are on land (i.e., within r′ meters of any road), and
PC to count all points within an escape destination’s radius
(i.e., within r′ meters of any escape destination). With these
counters, the area AL can be calculated as AL = (PL/P )∗A,
where P is the total number of points, and the area AC
can be calculated as AC = (PC/P ) ∗ A. Therefore, the
final percentage of coverage area of the escape paths using
Monte-Carlo simulation can be expressed as (PC/PL) ∗ 100.
The percentage of coverage is the ratio of the coverage area
calculated (using a walking radius of 100 m) to the total area
of land calculated using the Monte-Carlo simulation.
The results are shown in Figure 10. It can be observed that
cities with more regular grid-like patterns such as Chicago and
Manhattan, New York City are more vulnerable to attacks.
It is possible for an attacker to cover more than 60% of
the target land area without being detected. However, more
irregular cities like London, Frankfurt and Atlanta offer more
resistance. It is important to note that it is still possible to
reach 20% of the target geographic region even in these most
limiting cases. The percent of coverage reduces as route or trip
distances increases because as trip length increases so does
the probability of the presence of an unique road segment,
but also because the area of interest grows quadratically in
the distance between source and destination. For instance, for
a distance of 20km, the area of interest is 400km2 and the
coverage is 40km2 which is still significant. Also, note that the
above calculations present a lower-bound on the total coverage
area AC . This is because errors in distance calculation from
the accelerometer allows the attacker to cover much larger
distances. For example, in a number of escape routes computed
in our evaluation, up to 82% of final escape destinations were
located even beyond the area of interest used for evaluation,
with a mean of ≈ 46%.
V. COUNTERMEASURES
The above evaluations demonstrate significant threat of
spoofing in urban road networks even when both GPS and
the inertial sensors are used together for the localization
and tracking. In this section, we present some approaches to
mitigate spoofing attacks, specifically in road navigation and
tracking applications.
A. Deploying Accurate Accelerometer and Gyroscope Sensors
An obvious approach to mitigating the threat would be to
use high quality sensors. To measure the impact of sensor noise
on the potential of spoofing, we re-ran the simulations on the
cities using lower thresholds for the sensor noise. For this
evaluation, we set the thresholds using the 25th percentile of
the error distributions (c.f., Figure 5). The following thresholds
were set for the escape paths generator algorithm: Tθ = 1.4◦,
Tϑ = 0.2
◦, Td1 = 0.6 and Td2 = 1.6. Figure 11 shows
0 5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0
20
40
60
80
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(a) Atlanta
0 5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0
20
40
60
80
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(b) Beijing
0 5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0
10
20
30
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(c) Boston
0 5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0
20
40
60
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(d) Chicago
0 5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0
5
10
15
20
25
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(e) Frankfurt
5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0
20
40
60
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(f) Houston
0 5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(g) London
0 5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0
20
40
60
80
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(h) Manhattan
0 5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0
20
40
60
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(i) Paris
0 5 10 15 20
Route Distances (km)
0
20
40
60
P
er
ce
n
t
of
C
ov
er
ag
e
(j) San Francisco
Fig. 10: Coverage Area of the Attacker: In cities like New York and Chicago, an attacker can cover more than 60% of the
target land area without being detected.
the results of the simulations for Chicago and San Francisco.
Recall that both cities demonstrated high potential of spoof-
ing for many paths. Using the above thresholds, we see a
significant reduction in the percentage of routes that allow
more than 5 km of displacement. However, there are several
limitations with this approach. First, the sensors satisfying the
above parameters are equivalent to aviation and military-grade
sensors which are bulky and expensive (several thousands
of dollars) to deploy. Furthermore, they consume significant
amount of power (& 5watts) making it unsuitable for use in
majority of tracking applications. Moreover, the attacker can
still induce noise in the sensors by driving recklessly such as
consistently switching lanes and accelerating / decelerating.
B. Secure Navigation Path Selection
Recall that the attack algorithm searches for navigation
routes between the assigned start and end points containing
attributes with the high probability of occurrence in other
parts of the road network i.e., other sections of the graph
(c.f., Section III-C2). The final path score was calculated
using Equation (2). The idea behind generating paths more
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Fig. 11: Preliminary results of countermeasure: We see that
both using higher accuracy sensors (expensive, bulky, high
power) and our secure navigation path selection (easy to
deploy) significantly reduces the impact of the attack.
resilient to spoofing is to simply negate this path score, i.e.,
score = −(∏Mi=1 P (ϑ(si), θ(χi))). This has the effect of
assigning the highest score to a path containing road curvature
and turn angles with low probability of occurrence. These
paths are less favorable for spoofing because the curvatures
or turn angles in the path are more unique and, therefore, less
likely in other sections. The algorithm uses the same inputs
as the previous algorithm but sets the count of output paths
NP as 1, i.e., it outputs the most secure path it finds for the
given source and destination. In other words, the application or
service provider (e.g., logistics company) can assign “secure
navigation routes” that are hard to fake because of unique road
characteristics. Figure 11 shows the results of a preliminary
evaluations for Chicago and San Francisco. Comparing with
the original simulations, we again see that the attacker is
significantly limited in the amount of routes available to him
for reaching alternate destinations.
The key advantage of our secure navigation path algorithm
is that there is no changes needed to the existing GPS/INS
hardware tracking required. The company can simply choose
the “secure path” to travel instead of deploying new sensors for
every tracking device. Furthermore, even if there exists some
potential for spoofing in the best possible secure path, the
escape routes can be known well in advance and appropriate
countermeasure be taken to prevent it.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss relevant related work beginning
with prior works that have demonstrated various attacks on
GPS. In 2001, the Volpe report [48] first identified malicious
interference with the civilian GPS signal as a serious prob-
lem. Following this several researchers have demonstrated the
insecurity of GPS-based navigation by diverting the course
of a yacht [11], forcing drones [12] to land in a hostile area
and taken over navigation systems of transportation trucks [24]
using spoofed GPS signals. More recently, researchers demon-
strated a GPS signal generator that can be built for less than
$300 [43]. Today, there exist public software repositories [44]
as well as commercial GPS simulators [49], [50] that generate
GPS signals for any chosen trajectory or navigation route.
More advanced attacks were demonstrated in [51], [52] in
which the attackers takeover a target receiver that is already
locked onto (i.e., continuously receiving navigation messages)
authentic satellite signals without the receiver noticing any
disruption or loss of navigation data. It was also shown that a
variety of commercial GPS receivers were vulnerable and in
some cases even caused permanent damage to the receivers.
A number of countermeasures have been proposed against
GPS spoofing attacks. Several works [17], [18], [19] pro-
posed solutions that are cryptographic in nature and therefore
require modifications to the GPS infrastructure. Many non-
cryptographic countermeasures rely on detecting anomalies in
certain physical characteristics of the signal such as received
satellite signal strength [24], ambient noise floor levels, auto-
matic gain control values [20] and other data that are readily
available as receiver observables on modern GPS receivers.
Some other countermeasures [53], [54], [23] leveraged the sig-
nal’s spatial characteristics such as the received GPS signal’s
direction or angle of arrival. Some proposed and analyzed
the use of multiple synchronized GPS receivers [52], [55],
[56] to detect spoofing. They show that spoofing a set of
synchronized GPS receivers, with known relative distances
or geometrical constellation restricts the number of locations
from where an attacker can transmit the spoofing signals.
Some other works [21] leveraged the difficulty of completely
annihilating legitimate signals from the environment. Cross-
validation of the position estimates against alternate naviga-
tion systems such as Galileo [57] were also proposed. All
the above countermeasures require modifications to the GPS
infrastructure or receiver. The multi receiver solutions require
the receivers to be at least 5–6 m away from each other making
them unsuitable for road navigation applications.
In the context of road navigation and tracking, using
data from inertial sensors [29], [30], [31] alongside GPS is
emerging as a popular choice for tracking and navigation in
applications where spoofing and jamming are considered a
threat. The absence of any communication between the inertial
sensors and the external world for estimating the location
makes it robust to signal spoofing and jamming attacks.
Many works [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41] analyze and
show that inertial sensors are promising for detection and
mitigation of GPS spoofing attacks. Many commercial-off-the-
shelf GPS/INS products [32], [33], [34], [35] are available
and used in many civilian and military applications. Recently,
analog attacks have also been demonstrated on inertial sensors.
For example, WALNUT [58] shows how analog acoustic
injection attacks can affect the digital integrity of a capacitive
MEMS accelerometer. Son et al. [59] showed that acoustic
interference on MEMS gyroscopes in drones can cause them to
crash. In [60], Shoukry et al. demonstrate how to deliver fake
readings to a anti-lock braking systems (ABS) via the magnetic
wheel speed sensors using electro magnetic interference in an
automotive setting. In this paper, we show that magnetometers
are vulnerable to electromagnetic interference attacks and an
attacker can precisely control its output.
Given the emergence of GPS/INS solutions, we believe our
work emphasizes some fundamental security limitations of
GPS/INS for road navigation and tracking applications.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we evaluated the security guarantees of
GPS/INS based tracking and navigation for road transportation
systems. To this extent, we designed a suite of algorithms
that enable an attacker to derive escape routes and plausible
destinations to reach without raising alarms even with the INS-
aided GPS tracking and navigation system. We implemented
and evaluated the impact of the attack using both real-world
and simulated driving traces in more than 10 cities located
around the world and showed that is possible for an attacker
to evade detection and reach locations that are as far as 30
km away from the true destination and, in some cases, cover
more than 60% of the target geographic region. Finally, we
proposed countermeasures that do not require any hardware
modifications and yet can severely limit the attacker’s ability
to cheat.
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